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BURIAL OF A TORT: THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME
COURT'S TREATMENT OF TORTIOUS
MISHANDLING OF REMAINS IN
CHRISTENSEN v. SUPERIOR
COURT
"'A man's dying is more his survivors' affair than his own." 1
I. INTRODUCTION
From 1980 until 1987, numerous Southern California mortuaries
and crematoria engaged in the systematic desecration of human re-
mains.2 Bereaved families entrusted the bodies of some 16,5001 dece-
dents to the mortuaries and crematoria for dignified and respectful
disposition. The mortuaries and crematoria removed gold from the dece-
dents' teeth with pliers by a process known as "popping chops" or "mak-
ing the pliers sing."4 The decedents' bodies were then subjected to mass
organ harvesting, during which hearts, eyes, corneas, brains and other
body parts were removed and sold to companies for commercial distribu-
tion.' After organs were harvested, the mortuaries and crematoria cre-
mated the bodies of numerous decedents together,6 and placed the
remains in fifty-five gallon oil drums from which they were distributed to
the bereaved families who had innocently entrusted them with the cre-
mation of their family members.7
In 1987, the conduct of the mortuaries and crematoria was discov-
ered, and made public through media reports.' Several thousand family
members brought suit alleging emotional distress resulting from the mis-
treatment of their decedents' remains.9 Before the matter proceeded to
1. THOMAS MANN, THE MAGIC MOUNTAIN 532 (H.T. Lowe-Porter trans., Vintage Int'l
1992) (1924).
2. Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 878, 820 P.2d 181, 185, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d
79, 83 (1991).
3. Id. at 877 n.5, 820 P.2d at 184 n.5, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 82 n.5.
4. Opposing Brief on the Merits by Christensen Plaintiffs and Petitioners at 15, Christen-
sen (No. S016890) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 878, 820 P.2d at 185, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83.
9. The plaintiff class consisted of at least 6050 members. Id. at 877 n.5, 820 P.2d at 184
n.5, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 82 n.5.
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trial, however, the court had to resolve the question of which, if not all,
plaintiffs could sue the mortuaries and crematoria.10
The California Supreme Court asked and answered this question in
Christensen v. Superior Court,II and carved out tough new rules for emo-
tional distress tort law in the process. The court chose not to limit the
plaintiff class to only those persons who had contracted for, or who pos-
sessed the statutory right to control, the disposition of the decedents'
remains.1 2 Instead, the court recognized that the mortuaries and crema-
toria owed a duty to family members close to the decedent who were
aware that funeral or crematory services were being performed. 13 Those
family members could therefore sue for the negligent mishandling of
their decedents' remains. At the same time, however, the court held that
plaintiffs who had not witnessed the conduct in question could not estab-
lish the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and there-
fore could not sue for intentional mishandling of their decedents'
remains. 
14
This Note examines the California Supreme Court's decision in
Christensen, a case that is significant because it simultaneously articu-
lates a "bright line" rule for negligence actions involving mortuaries and
crematoria, 5 while it effectively eliminates similar liability predicated on
intentional tort. 6 This Note begins by exploring the background of tor-
tious liability for mishandling of human remains. 7 It includes a discus-
sion of theories other than tort law upon which plaintiffs have relied in
seeking recovery for mishandling of remains." Special attention is given
to the limitations of these alternative theories as options available to fam-
ily members who were not parties to the funeral contract.9
Part III examines the factual background and procedural posture of
the case, as well as the Christensen court's reasoning. It compares the
court's effort to recognize that a crematorium or mortuary owes a duty
10. Id. at 876, 820 P.2d at 183, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 81.
11. 54 Cal. 3d 868, 820 P.2d 181, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79 (1991).
12. Id. at 875, 820 P.2d at 183, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 81. California Health and Safety Code
§ 7100 establishes rights and duties in the disposition of human remains. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7100 (West 1970 & Supp. 1993). See infra part II.C.2.a for a discussion of
§ 7100.
13. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 875, 820 P.2d at 183, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 81.
14. Id at 906, 820 P.2d at 204, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102.
15. Id. at 918, 820 P.2d at 212, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110 (Kennard, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
16. Id. at 906, 820 P.2d at 204, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102.
17. See infra part II.
18. See infra part II.A-B.
19. See infra part II.B.3.
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to the immediate family of a decedent,2" with the court's ready willing-
ness to deny those same plaintiffs the right to sue for intentional mishan-
dling of remains.21
In part IV, this Note critically analyzes the majority's holding in
Christensen. While the court was correct in finding that mortuaries and
crematoria owe a duty to close family members of a decedent, and there-
fore granting those family members standing to sue for negligence,22 the
decision was elsewhere inconsistent. First, the majority was inconsistent
in finding a duty owed to close family members, while simultaneously
restricting recovery to only those plaintiffs who can show by "a well
founded substantial certainty"23 that their decedents' remains were
among those mistreated.24 Further, the majority was inconsistent in lim-
iting the class of plaintiffs who can sue for intentional mishandling of a
decedent's remains to those persons who contemporaneously viewed the
defendant's conduct.25
Finally, this Note recommends that the California Supreme Court
recognize the unique nature of the "mishandling of remains" tort and
abandon the requirement that the plaintiff be present at the scene of the
alleged conduct in order to sue for intentional mishandling of a dece-
dent's remains.26
II. BACKGROUND: TORTIOUS MISHANDLING OF
A DECEDENT'S REMAINS
For almost a century, California has recognized that civil liability
may arise from the mishandling of the remains of a decedent. 27 The con-
duct has been variously referred to as the "negligent handling of a
corpse, ' '2 the "tortious interference with a right to dispose of a dece-
20. See infra part III.C.1.
21. See infra part III.C.2.
22. See infra part IV.A.2.
23. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 902, 820 P.2d at 201, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99.
24. See infra part IV.A.3.
25. See infra part IV.B.
26. See infra part V.
27. See O'Donnell v. Slack, 123 Cal. 285, 289, 55 P. 906, 907 (1899).
28. Quesada v. Oak Hill Improvement Co., 213 Cal. App. 3d 596, 603, 261 Cal. Rptr. 769,
773 (1989).
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dent's remains,"2 9 "wilful mutilation of a corpse" 30 and "tortious inter-
ference with rights involving dead human bodies.
'31
However, while there is a long history of tortious liability for the
mishandling of a decedent's remains, plaintiffs have not relied solely on
tort theories in seeking recovery. Some early cases addressed the possi-
bility of predicating liability on the notion of a "property interest" in the
decedent's body.32 Another approach upon which some courts still rely
is to award emotional distress damages for breach of the funeral con-
tract,33 although, as will be discussed, this remedy is not entirely ade-
quate. Finally, the most common theory relied upon is tortious liability
for emotional distress suffered as a result of the defendants' conduct.
34
To better understand these various theories of recovery, this part will
examine each in turn.
4. Property Rights in the Decedent's Body
Plaintiffs in early California cases often sought to establish that, as
survivors, they possessed some "property rights" in the body of the dece-
dent. This, the plaintiffs argued, accorded them the right to recover for
its mishandling3" under the theory that the defendants' mishandling con-
stituted a trespass.36 While American courts have traditionally recog-
nized a "quasi-property" right in a decedent's body for the limited
purpose of determining who would have custody of the body for burial,37
29. Sinai Temple v. Kaplan, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1103, 1112, 127 Cal. Rptr. 80, 86 (1976).
30. Jack Leavitt, The Funeral Director's Liability for Mental Anguish, 15 HASTINGS L.J.
464, 473 (1964).
31. Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, 231 Cal. App. 2d 1, 4, 41 Cal. Rptr. 481, 483 (1964),
disapproved by Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 820 P.2d 181, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79
(1991).
32. See infra part II.A.
33. See infra part II.B.
34. See infra part II.C.
35. See O'Donnell v. Slack, 123 Cal. 285, 289, 55 P. 906, 907 (1899); Huntly v. Zurich
Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co., 100 Cal. App. 201, 207-09, 280 P. 163, 165-66 (1929); Leavitt,
supra note 30, at 472-73; Michelle B. Bray, Note, Personalizing Personality: Toward a Property
Right in Human Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209, 225-28 (1990).
36. See Harry R. Bigelow, Jr., Note, Damages: Pleading: Property: Who may recover for
wrongful disturbance of a dead body, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 108 (1933). Mr. Bigelow refers to the
theory
whereby the body was said to become a part of the realty upon burial and any inter-
ference with it was then trespass quare clausumfregit, for which the owner of the lot
had a right of action, if his ownership in the plot amounted to as much as an ease-
ment and was not a mere license.
Id. at 108. There is authority for the contrary position that the "trespass" in question is to the
body itself, and not to the realty in which it is buried. See Bray, supra note 35, at 227.
37. See Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227 (1872); Bray, supra note
35, at 227.
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plaintiffs in California cases rarely relied upon this right with any success
to establish liability for mishandling.38 In one early case, Huntly v. Zu-
rich General Accident & Liability Insurance Co. ,39 the court specifically
considered whether a plaintiff could allege ownership in the body of a
deceased human being, such that a cause of action could be maintained
for damages arising out of a wrongful autopsy.' After considering deci-
sions reached by courts of other jurisdictions on the issue, the court con-
cluded that "there is no ownership in the body of a deceased human
being."41
Commentators have criticized efforts to rely on the "quasi-
property" right to establish liability for mishandling of remains as merely
a fictional "hook" on which to hang liability that is really based on the
plaintiff's emotional distress.4 2 Given its lack of acceptance in California
courts, there is little reason to believe that the "quasi-property" right
theory has any value to a prospective plaintiff beyond the determination
of who shall have custody and responsibility for burial.
B. Recovery of Emotional Distress Damages for Breach of Contract
Another, more modern approach to assessing liability for the mis-
handling of a decedent's remains has been to award damages for breach
of the funeral contract to redress the aggrieved party's emotional suffer-
ing.43 Generally, the measure of damages in an action for breach of con-
tract is the amount that will compensate the aggrieved party for all
detriment proximately caused by the breach.' The vast majority of con-
tracts involve only commercial transactions.4" In these types of con-
38. See, eg., O'Donnell, 123 Cal. at 289, 55 P. at 907; Huntly, 100 Cal. App. at 209, 280 P.
at 166.
39. 100 Cal. App. 201, 280 P. 163 (1929).
40. Id. at 209, 280 P. at 166.
41. Id.; accord O'Donnell, 123 Cal. at 289, 55 P. at 907.
42. Bigelow, supra note 36, at 110; see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 63 (5th ed. 1984) ("It seems reasonably obvious that
such 'property' is something evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion, and that in reality the
personal feelings of the survivors are being protected, under a fiction likely to deceive no one
but a lawyer.").
43. See, e.g., Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 211, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445, 448 (1980).
44. Section 3300 of the California Civil Code provides: "For the breach of an obligation
arising from contract, the measure of damages... is the amount which will compensate the
party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, or which, in the ordinary
course of things, would be likely to result therefrom." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3300 (West 1970 &
Supp. 1993). California Civil Code § 3301 provides: "No damages can be recovered for a
breach of contract which are not clearly ascertainable in both their nature and origin." Id.
§ 3301 (West 1970 & Supp. 1993).
45. Allen, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 211, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
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tracts, it is generally not foreseeable that a breach will cause significant
emotional distress as distinguished from mere annoyance.46 Therefore,
plaintiffs usually may not recover for nonpecuniary losses, such as emo-
tional distress or annoyance, that result from a contract breach. 7
1. Rule for breach of "personal" contracts
There are certain types of contracts, however, that are so "personal"
in nature,a" and so affect the vital concerns of the individual, that it is
reasonably foreseeable that a breach will cause mental anguish to the
non-breaching party.49 Courts have allowed plaintiffs to recover emo-
tional distress damages for breach of contract in these situations.50 Ex-
amples of these contracts include contracts for long-term health care,5"
insurance contracts 52 and employment contracts.
53
A contract whereby a mortuary agrees to prepare a body for burial
is perhaps the best example of a "personal contract," the breach of which
will foreseeably cause the non-breaching party to suffer mental anguish. 4
This is because the parties to the funeral contract are usually in their
most difficult and delicate moments.5 5 Accordingly, a mortician's chief
asset is his or her ability to understand and cater to the feelings of the
afflicted. 6
The first California case in which a plaintiff recovered damages for
emotional distress resulting from the breach of a funeral contract was
Chelini v. Nieri.57 In Chelini, the plaintiff entered into an oral contract
46. Id.
47. See, eg., John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based
Upon Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV.
1565, 1584 (1986) ("Traditional contract law provides very limited opportunity for a plaintiff
to recover for nonpecuniary loss that may result from contract breach, such as emotional
distress, inconvenience, and annoyance."). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 353 (1981) (noting exclusion of recovery for emotional disturbance except where
bodily harm results or emotional disturbance was likely).
48. Allen, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 211, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
49. Id.
50. See id. See generally Charlotte K. Goldberg, Emotional Distress Damages and Breach
of Contract: A New Approach, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 57 (1986) (proposing new test for
determination of whether emotional distress was foreseeable at time of contract formation).
51. Westervelt v. McCullough, 68 Cal. App. 198, 228 P.2d 734 (1924).
52. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
53. Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984).
54. See Allen, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 211, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 448; Goldberg, supra note 50, at
68-69; Sebert, supra note 47, at 1584.
55. Allen, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 211, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
56. Id.
57. 32 Cal. 2d 480, 196 P.2d 915 (1948).
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with the defendant mortician to preserve the body of his mother.5 8 The
defendant agreed to embalm the body so that the corpse would keep "al-
most forever" and to provide a hermetically sealed casket.5 9 Several
months later, at the plaintiff's request, the vault containing the body was
opened in the plaintiff's presence." The flesh of the body had dis-
integrated and was covered with insects.61 The California Supreme
Court affirmed an award to the plaintiff of $10,000 in general damages,
on the basis that the plaintiff suffered physical illness as a result of view-
ing the condition of his mother's body.62
2. Physical injury requirement
One major limitation to recovery for emotional distress damages for
breach of contract was the requirement that the plaintiff suffer some
physical injury. 3 This requirement was an issue in another funeral con-
tract case, Allen v. Jones." In Allen, the plaintiff made an oral agree-
ment with a mortician to cremate his brother's body and ship the ashes
to Illinois.6" The ashes were thereafter lost in transit.6 The plaintiff
brought actions alleging breach of contract and tort, claiming nervous
shock, mental anguish and humiliation.67 The court in Allen relied on
the plaintiff's tort theory and did not directly address the question of
whether mental distress damages alone, without accompanying physical
injury, could support an action for breach of contract.68 However, in his
concurrence, Judge Gardner severely criticized the physical injury re-
quirement as nothing more than an artificial distinction. 9
58. Id. at 482, 196 P.2d at 916.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 483, 196 P.2d at 917.
61. Id. at 484, 196 P.2d at 917.
62. Id. at 481, 196 P.2d at 915-16.
63. See Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 213, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445, 449 (1980).
64. 104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1980).
65. Id. at 209, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 213, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 449. But see Goldberg, supra note 50, at 70 n.50 ("With-
out the physical injury requirement, the Allen court probably would have allowed the plaintiff
to plead emotional distress damages under a contract theory.").
69. Judge Gardner stated:
In no other area are the vagaries of our law more apparent than in the distinc-
tion between mental and emotional distress accompanied by physical manifestation
and such discomfort unaccompanied by physical manifestation....
I would like to see the Supreme Court take a sharp knife and cut this whole
cockamamie distinction out of the law.... It seems to me that the law should drag
itself into the 20th century and face up to the fact that mental anguish standing by
April 1993]
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The courts abolished the physical injury requirement for emotional
distress damages for breach of contract soon after the court's decision in
Allen. 70 The new rule was applied to a funeral contract in Ross v. Forest
Lawn Memorial Park. 1 In Ross, a mother arranged for a private funeral
and burial service for her daughter, a seventeen-year-old punk rocker. 2
While only family and invited guests were to attend, punk rockers at-
tended the funeral and burial, and disrupted the services.73 Police had to
be called to restore order to the services, and when the mother returned
the next day she discovered that the grave and flowers had been dis-
turbed.74 The court of appeal held that the plaintiff could recover for
emotional distress, even though she did not allege any physical injuries.75
The court reasoned that the nature of the contract made emotional dis-
tress damages foreseeable in the event of a breach.76
3. Recovery limited to the contracting parties
While the physical injury requirement no longer exists as a bar to
recovery of emotional distress damages for breach of a funeral contract,
the remedy is limited to the contracting parties, and therefore does not
redress the injuries of everyone who suffers emotional distress as a result
of a defendant's breach. Cohen v. Groman Mortuary77 presented pre-
cisely this problem.
In Cohen, nine members of the deceased's family brought actions
against the mortuary that contracted to provide funeral services and bur-
itself is as real as such anguish accompanied by some kind of a physical
manifestation.
Id. at 216-18, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 451-52 (Gardner, J., concurring).
70. See Wynn v. Monterey Club, 111 Cal. App. 3d 789, 801, 168 Cal. Rptr. 878, 884
(1980).
71. 153 Cal. App. 3d 988, 203 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1984).
72. Id. at 991, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
73. Id. at 991-92, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 470 ("Neither their appearance nor comportment was
in accord with traditional, solemn funeral ceremonies. Some were in white face makeup and
black lipstick ... while ... another wore a dress decorated with live rats.").
74. Id.
75. Id. at 995, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 473. The Ross court stated:
Respondent maintains that because appellant has not alleged physical injury no re-
covery is permissible. Respondent's duty to provide a private funeral and burial
arose from respondent's agreement to do so. Appellant seeks damages for emotional
rather than physical injury that resulted from respondent's failure to exclude the
unwanted guests. The contract was a lawful contract which by its nature put respon-
dent on notice that a breach would result in emotional and mental suffering by
appellant.
Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. 231 Cal. App. 2d 1, 41 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1964), disapproved by Christensen v. Superior
Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 820 P.2d 181, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79 (1991).
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ial of their decedent.7 8 The complaint alleged that the mortuary wrong-
fully substituted the body of another in place of the decedent, and that
the family members consequently suffered shock and mental anguish.7 9
Tort analysis aside, the court in Cohen held that only the two family
members who were parties to the contract could bring actions based on
the mortuary's duty to properly conduct the funeral service.8 °
Funeral contracts have not yet become an area in which third-party
beneficiaries to the contract are protected by the law.8 1 While this has
been criticized as inconsistent with the true nature of funeral and mortu-
ary contracts, 82 the fact remains that survivors who were not parties to
the contract cannot seek contract remedies, and must rely instead on tort
theories of recovery.
C. Tortious Infliction of Emotional Distress
Most plaintiffs seeking recovery for the mishandling of a decedent's
remains do so on some theory of tortious infliction of emotional distress.
Until now, nearly all successful California cases were predicated on the
theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress, 83 although plaintiffs
have sometimes sought recovery on an intentional theory where appro-
priate.84 Prior to Christensen v. Superior Court,5 California courts faced
several issues in deciding cases alleging emotional distress caused by the
mishandling of a decedent's remains.
1. The physical injury requirement
Analogous to the distinction formerly recognized in breach of con-
tract actions, historically courts were reluctant to allow recovery in tort
78. Id. at 3, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 482-83.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 9, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
81. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 42, § 93, at 667-71 (noting difficulty faced by
party who seeks damages for breach of contract to which he or she was not party). However,
permitting recovery for breach of duty that arises out of a third-party contract is consistent
with well-established California precedent. See Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16
(1958) (permitting recovery for negligently prepared will).
82. See, e.g., Leavitt, supra note 30, at 466.
83. See, e.g., Quesada v. Oak Hill Improvement Co., 213 Cal. App. 3d 596, 261 Cal. Rptr.
769 (1989). But see 2 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 9.4, at 624 (2d ed.
1986).
84. See, eg., Quesada, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 598, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 770; Allen v. Jones, 104
Cal. App. 3d 207, 210, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447 (1980); Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, 231 Cal.
App. 2d 1, 3, 41 Cal. Rptr. 481, 483 (1964), disapproved by Christensen v. Superior Court, 54
Cal. 3d 868, 820 P.2d 181, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79 (1991).
85. 54 Cal. 3d 868, 820 P.2d 181, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79 (1991).
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for mental distress not accompanied by physical injury. 6 The theory
underlying the physical injury requirement was that evidence of physical
injury guaranteed the sincerity of a plaintiff's claim. 7 However, while
physical injury was still required for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, many jurisdictions did not require that a plaintiff suffer physical
injury in order to recover for negligent mishandling of a corpse because
the special circumstances guaranteed the legitimacy of the claim.8 8 Fur-
ther, the California Supreme Court eventually abolished the physical in-
jury requirement for intentional infliction of emotional distress as well.8 9
2. Standing to sue
Determining who may properly sue was the major issue California
courts faced before Christensen in actions involving tortious mishandling
of remains.9" In deciding who may sue, courts have looked to statutory
guidelines91 and traditional negligence concepts of duty and fore-
seeability. 92
a. health and safety code section 7100
California Health and Safety Code section 7100 establishes the
boundaries of the right and obligation to dispose of family members' re-
86. See Allen, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 213, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 449; see also Peter H. Mixon,
Application of Transferred Intent to Cases of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 15
PAC. L.J. 147, 150-52 (1983) (noting early acceptance of physical injury requirement in actions
for tortious infliction of emotional distress).
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. k (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra
note 42, § 12, at 59-60.
88. Allen, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 213, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
89. See State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338, 240 P.2d 282, 286
(1952).
90. See, eg., Quesada v. Oak Hill Improvement Co., 213 Cal. App. 3d 596, 261 Cal. Rptr.
769 (1989); Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, 231 Cal. App. 2d 1, 41 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1964), disap-
proved by Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 820 P.2d 181, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79
(1991).
91. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7100; see infra part II.C.2.a.
92. See Quesada, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 603, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
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mains.93 California courts, including the trial court in Christensen,94
have occasionally relied on section 7100 to limit who may bring an action
for emotional distress engendered by the tortious mishandling of re-
mains.95 However, while the language of section 7100 may provide some
guidance on the question of which family members are owed a duty of
care by the funeral director or mortuary, the statute is hardly dispositive
on the issue.
96
b. duty of care
Because nearly all cases prior to Christensen dealt with the question
of which plaintiffs had standing to sue for a funeral director or mortu-
ary's negligence, as opposed to intentional conduct, 97 courts resolved the
standing question by applying traditional tort principles of duty of care
and foreseeability. When the only plaintiffs are parties to the funeral
contract or holders of the Health and Safety Code section 7100 right to
control disposition, California courts have consistently found that the fu-
neral director or mortuary owed the plaintiffs a duty of care.98 To arrive
93. California Health & Safety Code § 7100 provides, in relevant part:
The right to control the disposition of the remains of a deceased person, unless other
directions have been given by the decedent, vests in, and the duty of interment and
the liability for the reasonable cost of interment of such remains devolves upon the
following in the order named:
(a) The surviving spouse.
(b) The surviving child or children of the decedent.
(c) The surviving parent or parents of the decedent.
(d) The person or persons respectively in the next degrees of kindred in the order
named by the laws of California as entitled to succeed to the estate of the
decedent.
(e) The public administrator when the deceased has sufficient assets.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7100.
94. 54 Cal. 3d at 880, 820 P.2d at 186, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84.
95. See Sinai Temple v. Kaplan, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1103, 1112, 127 Cal. Rptr. 80, 86 (1976);
Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, 231 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5, 41 Cal. Rptr. 481,484 (1964), disapproved
by Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 820 P.2d 181, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79 (1991).
96. Courts have applied § 7100 to resolve disputes over the primary responsibility to dis-
pose of a decedent's remains, and to determine who will be liable for the costs of interment.
See Sinai Temple, 54 Cal. App. 3d at 1112, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 86; Cohen, 231 Cal. App. 2d at 5,
41 Cal. Rptr. at 484. Occasionally, however, courts have used § 7100 to extend rights even
further. See, eg., Ross v. Forest Lawn Memorial Park, 153 Cal. App. 3d 988, 203 Cal. Rptr.
468 (1984) (holding that as between mother and friends of teenaged decedent, mother could
sue for interference with right to private funeral).
97. But see Quesada v. Oak Hill Improvement Co., 213 Cal. App. 3d 596, 599-600, 261
Cal. Rptr. 769, 770-71 (1989) (addressing question of whether plaintiff could sue for being
ridiculed when she protested that mortuary had delivered the wrong body for burial).
98. See, e.g., Draper Mortuary v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 533, 185 Cal. Rptr.
396 (1982); Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1980).
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at this conclusion, courts have reasoned that, when the parties enter into
the funeral contract, a "special relationship" is thereby created.99
The question of duty is more difficult in cases in which the plaintiffs
are neither parties to the contract nor statutory rightholders, but instead
are family members or close friends of the decedent. Prior to the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's decision in Christensen, the California Court of Ap-
peal, in Cohen v. Groman Mortuary ie and Quesada v. Oak Hill
Improvement Co. ,' had arrived at conflicting conclusions on the issue
of whether family members who were not parties to the funeral contract
could sue for negligent mishandling of remains.
In Cohen, the brother, sister and other relatives of the decedent
brought suit against a mortuary that had substituted the body of another
for that of their sister at her funeral. 102 The plaintiffs claimed that they
suffered shock and mental anguish." 3 The trial court granted the de-
fendant mortuary's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to all plain-
tiffs except the widower and another brother who had contracted to pay
the funeral expenses.' The brother and sister appealed." 5 The court of
appeal affirmed, holding that, because the plaintiffs had not contracted
with the defendant, it could find "no legally protected right in connection
with the disposition of the body of... [the plaintiffs'] deceased sister, nor
any corresponding duty to them on the part of defendants."'0 6
The court of appeal reached the opposite conclusion in Quesada, a
case in which a funeral home delivered the wrong body to the cemetery
for burial.'0 7 When the family members protested, the mortuary employ-
ees ridiculed them and continued the burial ceremony. 0 8 The sister and
niece of the decedent thereafter sued for emotional distress. 109 The dece-
99. Draper, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 537-38, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 398-99. In his dissenting opin-
ion in Draper, however, Judge McDaniel argued that the special relationship notion should be
rejected in favor of a bystander theory consistent with Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Schabatka, 46 Cal.
App. 3d 887, 120 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1975), which held that no duty of care was owed to a hus-
band who was not present at the scene of the accident that caused his wife's death. Draper,
135 Cal. App. 3d at 538-42, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 399-401 (McDaniel, J., dissenting).
100. 231 Cal. App. 2d 1, 41 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1964), disapproved by Christensen v. Superior
Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 820 P.2d 181, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79 (1991).
101. 213 Cal. App. 3d 596, 261 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1989).
102. 231 Cal. App. 2d at 3, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 482-83.
103. Id.
104. Id., 41 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
105. Id., 41 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
106. Id. at 5, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
107. 213 Cal. App. 3d at 599-600, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
108. Id. at 600, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
109. Id. at 598, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
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dent's widow had already reached a settlement with the defendants." °
The trial court held that absent a contractual relationship or a statutory
duty, the funeral home owed the sister and niece no duty of care.111
The court of appeal in Quesada reversed, holding that the funeral
home owed a duty of care to the decedent's sister and niece.' 1 2 The court
first noted that the restrictive analysis applied in Cohen was no longer
applicable.113 In determining that a duty existed, the court instead relied
upon a foreseeability analysis.114 The court determined that the nature
of the funeral ritual made it not only foreseeable, but inevitable, that
close friends and family members would be present.115
The Quesada holding might seem to establish that a mortuary owes
a duty of care to the relatives and close friends of a decedent, the breach
of which may give rise to liability for emotional distress damages. How-
ever, given the very specific facts of Quesada, in which the plaintiffs con-
temporaneously witnessed the defendants' conduct, the case should not
compel a similar conclusion if the plaintiffs did not witness the mishan-
dling, but learned of it years later through media reports.
Before the California Supreme Court's decision in Christensen,
therefore, it was an open question whether a duty of care would extend to
all foreseeable plaintiffs, even those who did not witness the defendants'
conduct. A more compelling question before the supreme court was
what class of plaintiffs could state a cause of action against a mortuary or
crematorium for intentional mishandling of remains resulting in emo-
tional distress.
III. CHRISTENSEN V. SUPERIOR COURT: STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Factual Background
Various relatives and close friends of several thousand decedents
brought a class-action suit against numerous mortuaries, crematoria and
the Carolina Biological Supply Company, alleging mistreatment of their
decedents' remains.16 The plaintiffs specifically alleged that the "mortu-
ary defendants" entered into contracts to provide funeral-related services
and to cremate the remains of the plaintiffs' decedents "with dignity and
110. Id. at 599 n.2, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 770 n.2.
111. Id. at 598-99, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 769-70.
112. Id. at 599, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
113. Id. at 605, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 774.
114. Id. at 604, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
115. Id. at 606, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 775.
116. Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 876-80, 820 P.2d 181, 183-86, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 79, 81-84 (1991).
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respect."' 1 7 The mortuary defendants118 allegedly contracted with the
"crematory defendants," '1 19 which represented that they would perform
cremations in a dignified and respectful manner. The crematoria fur-
nished the mortuaries with forms with which to obtain consent to crema-
tion from the decedents' next of kin. 2°
The plaintiffs claimed that the crematory defendants cremated their
decedents' remains in a pottery kiln, in a disrespectful manner, with non-
human residue. 21 They allegedly cremated as many as ten to fifteen
bodies together. 122 The crematoria also took and sold gold and other
metals from the remains, and placed the cremated remains in urns or
other containers without preserving their identity. 23 Finally, the crema-
toria harvested organs and body parts from the decedents and sold them
for profit. 124
The plaintiffs alleged that another defendant, Carolina Biological
Supply Company, requested and purchased human organs and body
parts from the crematory defendants. 125 The plaintiffs claimed that Car-
olina did so under circumstances in which it knew or should have known
that desecration of human remains would necessarily occur. 126 The
plaintiffs alleged that, on discovering the conduct of the mortuaries and
crematoria through media reports, 127 they suffered and would continue
to suffer extreme emotional distress. 128
B. Procedural Posture
The Christensen complaint defined the plaintiff class as consisting of
surviving spouses, relatives and designated representatives of the dece-
dents. 129 The trial court requested the parties brief and argue the issue of
117. Id. at 877, 820 P.2d at 185, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83.
118. The "mortuary defendants" contracted directly with the decedents' representatives to
perform funeral services. Id.
119. The "crematory defendants" contracted only with the mortuaries, and not with the
decedents' representatives. Id.
120. Id. at 877-78, 820 P.2d at 185, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83.
121. Id. at 879, 820 P.2d at 186, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84.
122. Id., 820 P.2d at 185, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83.
123. Id.
124. Id., 820 P.2d at 185-86, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83-84.
125. Id. at 878, 820 P.2d at 185, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 879, 820 P.2d at 186, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84 ("On discovering defendants' miscon-
duct plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer 'physical injury, shock, outrage, extreme
anxiety, worry, mortification, embarrassment, humiliation, distress, grief, and sorrow.' ").
129. Id. at 876, 820 P.2d at 184, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 82.
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which plaintiffs could actually sue for the conduct alleged.13 ° The court
ruled that only those plaintiffs who were entitled by statute"' to control
the disposition of the decedents' remains as of the date of the decedents'
death, or who were parties to the funeral contract, could sue.132
The plaintiffs thereafter petitioned for a writ of mandate, seeking
modification of the pretrial order to include close family members and
friends of the decedents in the class of plaintiffs. 133 The court of appeal
held that close family members could state a cause of action for negligent
mishandling of a corpse, and that if the mishandling was intentional, all
family members and close friends of the decedent could sue.
134
The California Supreme Court modified the judgment of the court of
appeal. The court held that standing to sue for emotional distress engen-
dered by the defendants' negligence was limited to those close family
members who were aware that the services in question were being per-
formed, and on whose behalf the services were rendered. 135 With respect
to the issue of who could sue for intentional mishandling of remains, the
supreme court held that the court of appeal erred in concluding that any
plaintiffs had standing to sue.1 36 It reasoned that the court of appeal's
conclusion was based on the mistaken reasoning that the crematory and
mortuary defendants' conduct established the elements of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. 137
C. Reasoning of the Court
Justice Baxter wrote the California Supreme Court's majority opin-
ion, and separately addressed two issues. First, he discussed which plain-
tiffs had standing to sue for negligent mishandling of their decedents'
remains. Second, he addressed which plaintiffs could assert a cause ofaction for intentional mishandling of remains. 39
130. Id., 820 P.2d at 183, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 81.
131. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7100. See supra part II.C.2.a for a discussion of
§ 7100.
132. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 880, 820 P.2d at 186, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84.
133. Id. at 876, 820 P.2d at 184, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 82.
134. Id. at 882, 820 P.2d at 187, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85.
135. Id. at 900, 820 P.2d at 200, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98.
136. Id. at 902, 820 P.2d at 201, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99.
137. Id. at 902-03, 820 P.2d at 201, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99.
138. Id. at 883-902, 820 P.2d at 188-201, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86-99.
139. Id. at 902-06, 820 P.2d at 201-04, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99-102.
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1. Negligence
a. the duty question
The court first addressed the issue of whether it was bound by its
prior decisions in Dillon v. Legg"4 and Thing v. La Chusa 4 1 These
decisions limit the standing of plaintiffs who may sue for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress caused by injury to a third party to only those
plaintiffs who were "percipient witnesses" of the conduct in question.142
In Dillon, a mother was allowed to state a cause of action for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress after witnessing her daughter being
struck by a negligently driven automobile. 143 In Thing, a mother
brought suit for emotional distress when her child was struck by the de-
fendant's automobile."4 In Thing, the California Supreme Court held
that the victim's mother could not recover for emotional distress because
she was not present at the scene of the accident, did not observe the
defendant's conduct, and was not aware that her son was being
injured. 145
The court distinguished the facts in Christensen from those in the
line of cases commencing with Dillon and culminating in Thing. The
court first noted that the Dillon-Thing line of cases all involved defend-
ants who had no preexisting relationship with the plaintiffs. 146 As such,
the defendants had not assumed a duty of care beyond that owed to the
general public.147 The court further distinguished Christensen from Dil-
lon and Thing by recognizing that the peculiar nature of the funeral in-
dustry made it an exceptional case in which a family member could
observe the type of mishandling of remains alleged in the plaintiffs'
complaint.
148
The court determined that it did not need to rely on the type of
"bystander-witness" theory applied in Dillon and Thing, because it found
that the mortuaries and crematoria owed an affirmative duty to the close
family members of the decedents arising out of their special relation-
ship.14 9 Citing the court of appeal decision in Draper Mortuary v. Supe-
140. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
141. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
142. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 883-84, 820 P.2d at 188-89, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86-87.
143. 68 Cal. 2d at 730, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
144. 48 Cal. 3d at 647-48, 771 P.2d at 815, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
145. Id. at 669, 771 P.2d at 830, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
146. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 884, 820 P.2d at 189, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 887, 820 P.2d at 190-91, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 88-89.
149. Id.
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rior Court,150 the supreme court concluded that once a mortuary accepts
the care, custody and control of a decedent's remains it owes a duty of
care to the members of the decedent's family. 51
Next the court addressed the issue of whether the Carolina Biologi-
cal Supply Company could be liable to the plaintiffs, even though it did
not contract with the plaintiffs for the disposition of decedents' remains,
and therefore had no special relationship with the plaintiffs. 152 While the
court acknowledged that Carolina did not assume any duty to perform
funeral-related services,"5 3 it found that Carolina could reasonably fore-
see that its conduct of offering to purchase substantial quantities of
human organs and body parts from the crematory defendants would en-
courage the crematoria to obtain body parts in a manner that could cause
emotional distress to those who held the statutory right 154 to control the
disposition of their decedents' remains. 55 The court therefore held that
only the statutory right holders had standing to seek damages from Caro-
lina Biological Supply Company.
156
b. policy considerations
The court then discussed in detail the various policy considerations
that weigh in favor of recognizing that the mortuaries and crematoria
owe a duty to the decedents' close family members.
150. 135 Cal. App. 3d 533, 185 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1982). In Draper, the defendant mortuary
failed to lock the chapel where the decedent's remains were kept. Id. at 535, 185 Cal. Rptr. at
397. A third party entered the chapel, removed the decedent's clothing, and sexually assaulted
the decedent. Id The court held that the decedent's family members could state a cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 538, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
151. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 887-88, 820 P.2d at 191, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court also noted that the court of appeal reached a similar conclusion in Quesada
v. Oak Hill Improvement Co., 213 Cal. App. 3d 596, 261 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1989) (holding that
decedent's sister could recover for emotional distress suffered as result of mortuary's negli-
gence in handling corpse). Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 888, 820 P.2d at 191-92, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 89-91. The supreme court further acknowledged that two courts of appeal decisions, Cohen
v. Groman Mortuary, 231 Cal. App. 2d 1, 41 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1964), disapproved by Christen-
sen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 820 P.2d 181, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79 (1991), and Sinai
Temple v. Kaplan, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1103, 127 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1976), appeared to conflict with
its finding of a duty owed by the mortuaries and crematoria. Christensen, at 889-90, 820 P.2d
at 192-93, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 90-91. However, the court specifically disapproved of the Cohen
decision. Id. at 889, 820 P.2d at 193, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 91. Further, it distinguished Sinai
Temple as not involving the mishandling of a corpse. Id. at 890, 820 P.2d at 193, 2 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 91.
152. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 891, 820 P.2d at 194, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 92.
153. Id.
154. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7100; see supra part II.C.2.a.
155. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 894, 820 P.2d at 196, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94.
156. Id.
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i. foreseeability and certainty of injury
The court began by addressing the issue of foreseeability and cer-
tainty of injury in funeral-related services.15 7 The court noted that, in all
cases involving the liability of a mortuary for negligently conducting
funeral-related services, the relatives permitted to recover were aware
that the services were being performed, and were persons for whose bene-
fit the defendant had undertaken to provide the services.15 8 The court
reasoned that only those relatives were foreseeable victims of the defend-
ants' conduct, and concluded that the class of plaintiffs seeking recovery
for negligence should be limited to close relatives who were aware, and
for whose benefit the defendants agreed to perform funeral-related
services. 159
ii. moral blame
The court next addressed the mortuary and crematory defendants'
arguments that the policy of the state recognizes only the rights of parties
to the mortuary contract and the holders of the statutory right to control
the disposition of their decedents' remains.'" Citing several California
statutes,1 61 the court concluded that imposing civil liability for mishan-
dling remains is consistent with the degree of moral blame attached to
that sort of conduct, with the goal of deterring future harm of a similar
nature. 1
62
iii. burden and consequences to the community
The supreme court then addressed the defendants' argument that
imposing liability on the mortuary and crematory defendants would re-
sult in decreased availability or increased cost of funeral-related serv-
ices. 1 63 The court disagreed. It first noted that its limitation of the
plaintiffs' class to only those close relatives of the decedents who were
aware of the funeral-related services, and for whom the services were
157. Id.
158. Id. at 895, 820 P.2d at 197, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95.
159. Id. at 896, 820 P.2d at 197, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95.
160. Id.
161. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7100 (setting forth who has right to control disposi-
tion of decedent's remains); id. § 7152 (West 1970 & Supp. 1993) (limiting anatomical gifts if
decedent was member of religious group); id. § 7050.5 (West 1970 & Supp. 1993) (mandating
proper disposition of Native American remains); id. § 8115 (West 1970 & Supp. 1993) (permit-
ting cities and counties to establish standards governing interment). Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at
896-97, 820 P.2d at 197-98, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95-96.
162. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 898, 820 P.2d at 198, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 96.
163. Id.
[Vol. 26:909
TOR TIO US MISHANDLING OF REMAINS
being performed, reduced the defendants' potential liability."6 The
court then concluded that, although insurance may not be available to
the defendants because their conduct was intentional, the costs of avoid-
ing future misconduct was minimal.165
iv. disproportionate culpability
The supreme court next considered the defendants' argument that if
the "bystander-witness" limitation articulated in the Dillon-Thing line of
cases was not applied, the defendants would suffer liability that was dis-
proportionate to their culpability.16 6 In response, the court reiterated its
reasoning that requiring the plaintiffs to be percipient witnesses of the
defendants' conduct is unrealistic in the context of torts involving
funeral-related services.167 The court also reiterated that the class of po-
tential plaintiffs who may sue for negligent mishandling of their dece-
dents' remains is appropriately limited to only those close relatives who
were aware of the nature of the funeral-related services that were to be
performed on their behalf.
68
v. causation
Finally, the court considered the mortuary and crematory defend-
ants' argument that the plaintiffs could not establish a causal connection
between their emotional distress and the media reports of the defendants'
alleged conduct. 69 The court first stated that media reports of a general
pattern of conduct were not sufficient, in and of themselves, to establish
that the defendants' alleged misconduct included mishandling of the re-
mains of each plaintiff's decedent.
170
The court then concluded that the question of whether each plaintiff
could establish that he or she knew that his or her decedent was a victim
of the defendants' misconduct was not relevant to the court's determina-
tion of which plaintiffs had standing.1 7 1 For standing purposes, the only
question was whether the plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently alleged direct
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 899, 820 P.2d at 199, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 900, 820 P.2d at 200, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98.
169. Id
170. Id at 901, 820 P.2d at 200, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98.
171. Id. at 902, 820 P.2d at 201, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99.
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causation between the defendants' conduct and the plaintiffs' emotional
distress. 172 The court concluded that it did. 173
2. Intentional tort
The court of appeal in Christensen had reached the conclusion that,
because the mishandling of the decedents' remains was intentional and
outrageous, all family members and close friends of the decedents could
recover for emotional distress caused by the defendants' conduct.174 The
California Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion and agreed
with the trial court that, because no plaintiffs alleged they were present
when the misconduct occurred, and the defendants had not acted with
intent to cause emotional distress toward the plaintiffs, they did not have
standing to sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising
from the mishandling of their decedents' remains.
1 75
The court first examined the elements necessary to establish a cause
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 76 Noting the
requirement of intentional or reckless, outrageous conduct, the court
stated that the mere fact that the conduct was both intentional and outra-
geous was insufficient.177 Rather, the court concluded that the conduct
must also be specifically directed toward the plaintiff.1
78
The court acknowledged that there have been instances of recovery
for mishandling of remains on a theory of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. 171 However, it concluded that, to justify recovery on this
172. Id. at 901, 820 P.2d at 201, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99.
173. Id. The court also briefly addressed the argument that permitting recovery under the
facts of Christensen would create tort liability for the emotional impact of reports broadcast in
the evening news. Id. at 901-02, 820 P.2d at 201, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99. The court rejected this
argument, noting that "[a] plaintiff who is unable to establish that he or she suffered severe
emotional distress, and that the emotional distress was caused by a well-founded substantial
certainty that his or her decedent's remains were among those reportedly mistreated, may not
recover damages." Id. at 902, 820 P.2d at 201, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99.
174. Id. at 902-03, 820 P.2d at 201, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99.
175. Id. at 906, 820 P.2d at 204, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102.
176. The court listed the elements as:
"'(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of caus-
ing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the
plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual or proximate
causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct....' Con-
duct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually
tolerated in a civilized community."
Id. at 903, 820 P.2d at 202, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 100 (quoting Davidson v. City of Westminster,
32 Cal. 3d 197, 209, 649 P.2d 894, 901, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252, 259 (1982)).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 905, 820 P.2d at 203, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101.
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theory, the conduct must be directed at the plaintiff. Alternatively, if
reckless disregard is the basis of recovery, the plaintiff must be present at
the time of the conduct and the defendant must know of the plaintiff's
presence.180
The court concluded that, because none of the plaintiffs had alleged
that the mortuary or crematory defendants' conduct was directed pri-
marily at them, was calculated to cause them severe emotional distress,
or was done with the knowledge of their presence, none of the plaintiffs
had standing to sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress associ-
ated with the mishandling of their decedents' remains."'
3. Justice Mosk's concurrence and dissent
Justice Mosk agreed with the majority on the issue of which plain-
tiffs may properly sue for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising
out of the mishandling of their decedents' remains.18 2 However, he dis-
sented on the issue of which plaintiffs may sue for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
18 3
Justice Mosk found it "paradoxical" that the majority held the de-
fendants liable for negligence but not for intentional tort when their con-
duct was so reprehensible.18 4 He asserted that the intent element in an
intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action may be estab-
lished in three ways,1 85 including reckless behavior leading to emotional
180. Id. at 906, 820 P.2d at 204, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102. The court stated: "Where reckless
disregard of the plaintiff's interests is the theory of recovery, the presence of the plaintiff at the
time the outrageous conduct occurs is recognized as the element establishing a higher degree of
culpability.. . ." Id.
181. Id. In its conclusion, the court briefly considered an ambiguity raised by the court of
appeal's decision that Health and Safety Code § 7100 devolves. Id. The court clarified that,
while the statutory right to control the disposition of a decedent's remains does devolve, the
class of plaintiffs who may sue for negligent mishandling of their decedents' remains is limited
to those close family members who were aware of the funeral-related services. Id.
182. Id. at 907, 820 P.2d at 204, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102 (Mosk, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
183. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
184. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Mosk stated:
The majority assert [sic] that to require defendants to perform the acts in plaintiffs'
presence ensures the high degree of culpability necessary to justify the greater dam-
ages allowed in an IIED [intentional infliction of emotional distress] case. In my
view, if the acts alleged are found to be true, defendants are highly culpable regard-
less of whether plaintiffs witnessed the mutilation.
Id., 820 P.2d at 204-05, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102-03 (Mosk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
185. "IIED may be shown in three ways: a subjective intention to cause emotional distress,
a substantial certainty that such distress could result, or reckless behavior leading to emotional
distress." Id., 820 P.2d at 205, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103 (Mosk, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
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distress. While the mortuary and crematory defendants may not have
had a subjective intent to inflict emotional distress on the plaintiffs, they
were reckless in that they must have known that their conduct would
potentially cause the decedents' family members severe emotional
distress. 186
Justice Mosk further noted that the majority placed unjustified lim-
its on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.187 He stated
that the public policy limitations imposed on liability for intentional con-
duct are not the same as those imposed on liability for negligence.I88 He
emphasized that society seeks to punish the intentional wrongdoer, not
the negligent individual. 8 9 Finally, he expressed that he would not limit
the class of potential plaintiffs who may sue for intentional mishandling
of remains to family members, because a close friend of the decedent
could conceivably establish that he or she suffered severe emotional dis-
tress as a result of the defendants' conduct.1 90
4. Justice Kennard's concurrence and dissent
Justice Kennard agreed with the majority that the complaint did not
state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.191
She further agreed that, where the plaintiffs held the statutory1 92 or con-
tractual right to control the disposition of their decedents' remains, those
plaintiffs need not have witnessed the alleged mishandling of remains in
order to state a cause of action for negligence.193
Justice Kennard disagreed, however, with the majority on the issue
of who, beyond those who held a statutory or contractual right, may sue
for negligent mishandling of remains.1 94 She believed that the majority
disregarded the court's prior decisions limiting the scope of liability for
intangible injuries.1 95 In Justice Kennard's view, the mere fact that it
186. Id. at 907-08, 820 P.2d at 205, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103 (Mosk, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
187. Id. at 908, 820 P.2d at 205, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103 (Mosk, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
188. Id. at 909, 820 P.2d at 206, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 104 (Mosk, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
189. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
190. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
191. Id. at 910, 820 P.2d at 206, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 104 (Kennard, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
192. CAL. HEALTH & SAETY CODE § 7100; see supra part II.C.2.a.
193. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 910, 820 P.2d at 206, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 104 (Kennard, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
194. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
195. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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was foreseeable that the defendants' conduct would cause the plaintiffs to
suffer emotional distress was insufficient. 19 6 She stated that she would
have limited the class of plaintiffs who could state a cause of action for
negligence without witnessing the defendants' conduct to the statutory
rightholders and contracting parties; all others would be required to
prove that they witnessed the conduct in question.197
Finally, Justice Kennard took issue with the majority's conclusion
that a plaintiff is required to show "by a well-founded substantial cer-
tainty" that their decedents' remains were among those mishandled.19
Viewing this as inconsistent with the finding of a duty extending to close
family members, Justice Kennard declared that a plaintiff should only be
required to prove that the defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of
mistreating remains. 199 The burden should then shift to the mortuary or
crematory defendants to prove that the decedents' remains were not
mishandled.2'
IV. ANALYSIS
By its holding in Christensen, the California Supreme Court ex-
panded liability for negligent conduct, 01 but drastically restricted liabil-
ity for the same acts committed intentionally.2"2 Even the burden of
proof the court placed on potential negligence plaintiffs will function to
preclude many from recovery.203 As a consequence of the court's hold-
ing, numerous plaintiffs' emotional distress claims arising out of the mor-
tuary and crematory defendants' conduct will go unredressed. 2°4 What
is perhaps worse, those defendants who were entrusted with the bodies of
decedents, and who thereafter committed acts of mishandling-including
ripping out and selling human organs, commingling ashes, and "uncere-
moniously" disposing of commingled ashes-will not be held accounta-
ble to the plaintiffs for their clearly intentional acts.
196. Id at 912, 820 P.2d at 208, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 106 (Kennard, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
197. Id at 914, 820 P.2d at 209, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 107 (Kennard, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
198. Id at 919, 820 P.2d at 213, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111 (Kennard, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
199. Id at 919-20, 820 P.2d at 213, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111 (Kennard, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
200. Id (Kennard, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
201. Id. at 883-902, 820 P.2d at 188-201, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86-99.
202. Id at 902-06, 820 P.2d at 201.04, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99-102.
203. Id. at 902, 820 P.2d at 201, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99.
204. Id at 919, 820 P.2d at 213, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111 (Kennard, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
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A. The Court's Treatment of Negligent Mishandling of Remains
1. Rejecting the bystander-witness theory
The California Supreme Court was correct to reject an application
of the "bystander-witness" theory to negligence in the context of funeral-
related services. The bystander-witness theory, which was first articu-
lated in Dillon v. Legg,2 °0 and modified in Thing v. La Chusa,2 °6 reflects a
public policy exception to the general rule that accords liability to those
who cause injury to another by failing to exercise ordinary care.20 7 The
theory limits the right of a bystander, who was not threatened with phys-
ical injury, to recover only for emotional distress suffered as a result of
witnessing negligent conduct causing injury to a third person.208 While
the theory may have some proper application in a funeral scenario in
which the plaintiff actually is a bystander,20 9 its application is misplaced
where it is improbable that the plaintiffs would witness the conduct.
210
Where the conduct of a mortuary or crematorium occurs after the
funeral service, behind closed doors, there is no possibility that the plain-
tiffs will be percipient witnesses.211 As the Christensen court correctly
noted, the responsibility assumed by the mortuary defendants includes
the obligation to prepare the decedents' remains for cremation.212 This
responsibility is delegated to the mortuary because the decedents' family
205. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
206. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
207. The California Civil Code codifies the standard for ordinary care. Section 1714(a)
provides, in relevant part:
Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an
injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management
of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of
ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1993).
208. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 885, 820 P.2d at 189-90, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87-88.
209. For example, in Quesada v. Oak Hill Improvement Co., 213 Cal. App. 3d 596, 261
Cal. Rptr. 769 (1989), the plaintiffs were bystanders, and witnessed the results of the defend-
ants' conduct. The defendants delivered the wrong body to the cemetery and ridiculed the
plaintiffs when they protested. Id. at 599-600, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 770-71. Similarly, in Cohen v.
Groman Mortuary, 231 Cal. App. 2d 1, 41 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1964), disapproved by Christensen
v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 820 P.2d 181, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79 (1991), the plaintiffs viewed
the wrong body at the funeral service. Id. at 3, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
210. See Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583, 770 P.2d
278, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1989). "[T]he Dillon guidelines... [serve] only to define the scope of
duty where plaintiff sought to recover damages suffered as the percipient witness to another's
injury." Id. at 589 n.4, 770 P.2d at 281 n.4, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 101 n.4.
211. See Gail D. Cox, Cremation Litigation: Lurid, but Often Lucrative, NAT'L L.J., Sept.
21, 1987, at 14, 14 ("The cremation procedure is one that society has been happy to keep
behind closed doors.").
212. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 890-91, 820 P.2d at 193, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 91.
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members do not want to undertake or witness this preparation.21 3 Ap-
plying the limits created by the bystander-witness approach to mishan-
dling of remains in situations in which no plaintiff is likely to witness the
conduct would, in effect, immunize mortuaries and crematoria from
emotional distress liability.214
2. Recognition of a duty of care
The court in Christensen also correctly observed that the bystander-
witness theory developed out of cases in which the defendants had no
preexisting relationship with the plaintiffs, and therefore had not as-
sumed a duty of care beyond that owed to the public in general.215 As
those cases are factually distinguishable from Christensen, a different
negligence analysis should apply.
The Christensen court properly reasoned that when a mortuary
agrees to provide funeral services and burial or cremation of a decedent,
a special relationship is created between the mortuary and the close rela-
tives of the decedent.216 This special relationship imposes a duty on the
mortuary to perform the funeral-related "services in the dignified and
respectful manner [that] the bereaved expect of mortuary and crematory
operators. ' ' 217 When the mortuary and crematory defendants mishandle
the remains of a decedent, they breach this duty of care and are liable to
the close family members for emotional distress that proximately
results.218
3. Burden of proof
Justice Kennard, writing separately in Christensen, appropriately re-
marked that: "What the majority gives with one hand, it takes with the
213. Id at 886-87, 820 P.2d at 190, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 88.
214. Id. at 887, 820 P.2d at 190-91, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 88-89. The supreme court's rejection
of the bystander-witness theory is entirely consistent with the California Court of Appeal's
reasoning in Quesada v. Oak Hill Improvement Co., 213 Cal. App. 3d 596, 261 Cal. Rptr. 769
(1989), and Draper Mortuary v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 533, 185 Cal. Rptr. 396
(1982).
215. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 884, 820 P.2d at 189, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87.
216. Id. at 890-91, 820 P.2d at 193, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 91.
217. Id. at 891, 820 P.2d at 193, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 91. The California Supreme Court
previously recognized that a duty may arise out of a special relationship, the breach of which
may result in emotional distress damages. See Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical
Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583, 590, 770 P,2d 278, 282, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98, 102 (1989).
218. Notably, the Christensen court did limit the class of persons to whom the mortuary
owes this duty to only those dose relatives of the decedent who were aware that funeral-related
services were to be undertaken. See 54 Cal. 3d at 896, 820 P.2d at 197, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95.
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other."2 19 While the majority broadened the scope of liability for
mishandling remains, the court simultaneously restricted recovery by
those plaintiffs who could not show by "a well-founded substantial cer-
tainty" that their decedents' remains were "among those reportedly
mistreated."22 0
The court imposed this burden to ensure a sufficiently direct causal
connection between the mortuary and crematory defendants' conduct
and the plaintiffs' alleged emotional distress.221 However, the particular
type of conduct alleged in Christensen occurred in secret, and was only
discovered years after it took place.222 The plaintiffs themselves only dis-
covered the possibility that their decedents' remains had been mishan-
dled through public media reports.223 Application of the Christensen
court's burden of "well-founded substantial certainty" will likely pre-
clude recovery for many, if not all, of the plaintiffs whose interests were
invaded.224 Further, this burden is inconsistent with the burden placed
on other civil litigants, who are required only to prove a defendant's neg-
ligence by a preponderance of the evidence.225
A better approach to the burden of proof issue is that proposed by
Justice Kennard in her concurring and dissenting opinion. Under Justice
Kennard's approach, once the plaintiffs prove that they suffered emo-
tional distress caused by the knowledge that their decedent was entrusted
to the defendants for cremation during a time when the defendants fre-
quently mishandled remains, the burden of proof shifts to the mortuary
and crematory defendants to prove that the remains were not
mishandled.226
219. Id at 919, 820 P.2d at 213, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111 (Kennard, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
220. Id at 902, 820 P.2d at 201, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99.
221. Id. at 901, 820 P.2d at 201, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99.
222. Id. at 878, 820 P.2d at 185, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 919, 820 P.2d at 213, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111 (Kennard, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
225. California Evidence Code § 115 provides, in relevant part: "Except as otherwise pro-
vided by law, the burden of proof requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence." CAL.
EVID. CODE § 115 (West 1966 & Supp. 1993); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 42, § 38, at
239 ("In civil suits ... the jury [must] be convinced... that a preponderance of the evidence is
in favor of the party sustaining the burden.").
226. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 919-20, 820 P.2d at 213, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111 (Kennard, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Such burden shifting is well established in California.
See, e-g., Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970)
(holding that pool owner has burden of showing statutory violation was not cause of death by
drowning); Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (shifting burden to each of two
hunters to establish that other's gunshot caused plaintiff's injury).
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In sum, while the court was correct to reject the bystander-witness
approach in favor of recognizing a duty running from the mortuaries to
the plaintiffs, the court's imposition of the "well-founded substantial cer-
tainty" burden of proof will operate to preclude many plaintiffs who
would otherwise qualify for recovery.22 The court should reject this
burden of proof in favor of an approach that places the burden on the
tortfeasors to prove they did not participate in the alleged mishandling.
B. Intentional Mishandling of Remains
In Christensen the supreme court held that none of the plaintiffs
could sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by the
mishandling of their decedents' remains, because the defendants' conduct
was not directed at them and they did not witness-it.22 In so holding,
the court effectively immunized the mortuary and crematory defendants
for their indisputably outrageous intentional conduct. An examination
of several factors compels the conclusion that the Christensen court was
incorrect in denying the plaintiffs an opportunity to plead a cause of ac-
tion for intentional mishandling of remains.
1. The defendants' conduct satisfies the elements of intentional
infliction of emotional distress
The Christensen plaintiffs should have been able to state a cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, as that tort has been
recognized. California defines the elements of a cause of action for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress as:
"(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the
intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of
causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or
extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate cau-
sation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous
conduct.... Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as
to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized
community.
229
In mishandling the remains of decedents entrusted to their care, the
mortuary and crematory defendants' conduct was admittedly outra-
227. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 919, 820 P.2d at 213, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111 (Kennard, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
228. Id. at 906, 820 P.2d at 204, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102.
229. Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 209, 649 P.2d 894, 901, 185 Cal.
Rptr. 252, 259 (1982) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Cervantez v. J.C. Penney
Co., 24 Cal. 3d 579, 593, 595 P.2d 975, 983, 156 Cal. Rptr. 198, 206 (1979)).
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geous. A trier of fact could conclude that the defendants acted with
reckless disregard of the probability that the plaintiffs would suffer emo-
tional distress.230 Under the established definition of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, the plaintiffs should therefore be able to state a
cause of action.
The California Supreme Court, however, was unwilling to accord
plaintiffs standing to sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress
under the reckless disregard theory because no plaintiffs witnessed the
defendants' conduct.231 In so holding, the court applied the rule that
limits liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out
of a reckless disregard of the plaintiff's interests to situations where the
plaintiff was present at the time the conduct occurred.232 The court
stated that this presence requirement ensures the high degree of culpabil-
ity necessary to justify the greater damages available in an intentional
infliction of emotional distress case.2 33
This reasoning is flawed, however, when applied to a case like Chris-
tensen because the nature of the conduct is such that the defendant is
highly culpable regardless of whether the plaintiffs were present to wit-
ness the mutilation.234 The plaintiffs in these cases entrusted the mortu-
aries and crematoria with the remains of their deceased family members.
The defendants violated this trust by ripping out organs, commingling
remains and disposing of corpses in a disrespectful manner. While this
conduct by its very nature takes place out of the family's presence,
235
there is a great probability that it will cause a deceased's family members
emotional distress if the conduct is ever discovered.
Further, the court expressly rejected an application of a bystander-
witness theory236 in holding that close family members could state a
cause of action for negligent mishandling of remains.237 Why the court
chose not to require the plaintiffs to have witnessed the defendants' con-
230. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 42, § 34, at 213 (stating that reckless disregard may be
found from acts "of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that
was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow").
231. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 906, 820 P.2d at 204, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 907, 820 P.2d at 205, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103 (Mosk, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). Prosser and Keeton note that tortious mishandling of remains presents "an
especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress, arising from the special circum-
stances, which serves as a guarantee that the claim is not spurious." KEETON ET AL., supra
note 42, § 54, at 362.
235. See Cox, supra note 211, at 14.
236. See supra part III.C.l.a for a discussion of the bystander-witness theories.
237. See Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 883-94, 820 P.2d at 188-96, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86-94.
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duct to sue for negligence, but required those same plaintiffs to have wit-
nessed the conduct to sue for intentional tort, is unclear.2 3' This
inconsistency is problematic, and the court should have allowed the
plaintiffs to sue on the theory of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
2. Mishandling of remains is a unique tort
The majority's refusal to allow the plaintiffs to sue for intentional
tort may be rooted in the court's unwillingness to recognize intentional
mishandling of remains as a tort independent from intentional infliction
of emotional distress. 23 9 By refusing to recognize the independent nature
of the tort of mishandling of remains, the court backed itself into a posi-
tion where it had to deny recovery to plaintiffs for emotional distress
because of restrictions created by prior cases with facts entirely dissimilar
to those in Christensen.20
The unique nature of the conduct at issue in Christensen warrants
the recognition of a unique tort. The conduct alleged was mutilation of a
decedent's remains, commingling of remains and unauthorized harvest-
238. Justice Mosk notes this inconsistency in his concurring and dissenting opinion in
Christensen:
The limits that the majority seek to place on the tort of IIED are, in this context,
unjustified. To require that plaintiffs be present at the scene of the outrageous con-
duct is unrealistic. It will be a rare case indeed in which a funeral home mutilates a
decedent's body in the presence of the grieving family or displays the mutilated body
to them. The majority thus effectively limit [sic] a plaintiff's recourse in cases involv-
ing this type of reprehensible conduct to the lesser tort of NIED [negligent infliction
of emotional distress].
Id. at 908, 820 P.2d at 205, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103 (Mosk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
239. See id. at 884, 820 P.2d at 188-89, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86-87. "It is true, as defendants
observe, that the tort with which we are concerned is negligence. Negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress is not an independent tort, nor is negligent mishandling of human remains." Id.
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). The Christensen court also stated:
Recovery on an intentional inifiction of emotional distress theory and based on reck-
less conduct has been allowed in the funeral-related services context. However,
as Professors Prosser and Keeton note, the cases which describe the tort as inten-
tional mishandling of a corpse actually seek to protect the personal feelings of the
survivors. Therefore the tort is properly categorized as intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress ....
Id. at 905, 820 P.2d at 203, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
240. An example of this is the Christensen court's reliance on Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co.,
24 Cal. 3d 579, 595 P.2d 975, 156 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1979), in which the court granted recovery
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, where the plaintiff was arrested despite the de-
fendants' knowledge that the plaintiff had not committed an offense. The Christensen court
cites this case for the proposition that intentional infliction of emotional distress requires con-
duct directed toward a particular plaintiff. See 54 Cal. 3d at 903, 820 P.2d at 202, 2 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 100.
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ing of organs.24 Because no court in California had addressed conduct
of this sort-mistreating of dead bodies done behind closed doors-the
court should have approached the plaintiffs' allegations with the purpose
of redressing their injuries, and should have regarded the prior case law
as instructive, not restrictive.
Further, it is unclear why the court refused to acknowledge a new
tort tailored to the peculiar nature of the defendants' outrageous con-
duct, when such an acknowledgement is widely accepted in tort law.242
In fact, cases decided prior to Christensen have freely recognized the
unique nature of the mishandling of remains tort,24 3 and have tailored
their analysis accordingly. 2 4 If the majority had simply recognized the
unique nature of the tort of mishandling of remains, it could have ac-
corded the plaintiffs standing without feeling it was disturbing prior case
law.
3. Applying the doctrine of transferred intent
The court rejected out of hand the application of transferred intent
to tortious mishandling of remains.245 The doctrine of transferred intent
dictates that when a defendant intends to harm a person other than the
plaintiff or intends to cause a type of harm different from the actual in-
jury sustained by the plaintiff, the defendant's tortious intent is "trans-
241. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 879, 820 P.2d at 185, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83.
242. As Professors Prosser and Keeton state:
New and nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and the progress of the
common law is marked by many cases of first impression, in which the court has
struck out boldly to create a new cause of action, where none had been recognized
before. The intentional infliction of mental suffering .... the invasion of the right of
privacy, the denial of the right to vote, the conveyance of land to defeat a title, the
infliction of prenatal injuries, the alienation of the affections of a parent.... to name
only a few instances, could not be fitted into any accepted classifications when they
first arose, but nevertheless have been held to be torts. The law of torts is anything
but static, and the limits of its development are never set. When it becomes clear that
the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the conduct of the de-
fendant, the mere fact that the claim is novel will not of itself operate as a bar to the
remedy.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 42, § 1, at 3-4.
243. See Quesada v. Oak Hill Improvement Co., 213 Cal. App. 3d 596, 604 n.3, 261 Cal.
Rptr. 769, 773 n.3 (1989):
The fact that the expected, and often sole, injury flowing from such tort is that of
mental trauma does not transform the cause of action into one for the... infliction of
emotional distress. This is not an instance of recovery being based solely on infliction
of emotional distress, but rather the respondents' duties toward the close relatives of
the deceased to handle the corpse properly.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
244. See id.
245. Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 905, 820 P.2d at 203, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101.
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ferred" to the resulting injury that the plaintiff actually suffered.2 46 The
defendant is therefore rendered liable for the harm he or she caused.247
The doctrine of transferred intent has not been applied to broaden
the scope of liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress.248
However, plaintiffs who are unintended victims may establish the requi-
site intent to cause emotional distress if the defendant's outrageous con-
duct was substantially certain to cause the plaintiff emotional distress.249
Further, the doctrine of transferred intent is available where the de-
fendant intended to commit an assault upon a third party but instead
caused injury to the plaintiff.250 As recovery for both assault and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress share a common purpose-protec-
tion of an individual's interest in freedom from mental invasion25'-it is
unclear why intentional infliction of emotional distress, unlike the tort of
assault, should continue to be exempt from the doctrine of transferred
intent.
Applying transferred intent to the conduct of the mortuary and cre-
matory defendants would have compelled the Christensen court to reach
a different result on the standing issue. The conduct directed toward the
remains of the decedents entrusted to the defendants' care would be
transferred to the family members who so entrusted the remains. This
would satisfy the intent requirement that the Christensen court found
lacking, and eliminate the standing barriers faced by plaintiffs who wish
to sue for intentional mishandling of their decedents' remains.
4. Moral culpability
Because compensation in tort law is based largely on the concept of
the defendant's fault,252 the moral culpability of the defendant's conduct
should be a strong factor in deciding liability.253 Application of this prin-
246. Mixon, supra note 86, at 147.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 149.
249. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 87, § 46 cmt. 1; Mixon, supra note
86, at 152.
250. See Mixon, supra note 86, at 148.
251. Id. at 163.
252. See id. at 159; Lawrence Vold, The Legal Allocation of Risk in Assault, Battery and
Imprisonment.-The Prima Facie Case, 17 NEB. L. BULL. 149, 163 (1938).
253. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 113, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100
(1968); Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 314-15, 379 P.2d 513, 525, 29
Cal. Rptr. 33, 45 (1963), overruled by Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 71 (1968); Mixon, supra note 86, at 159. The Amaya court stated: "[T]he increased
liability imposed on an intentional wrongdoer appears to reflect the psychological fact that
solicitude for the interests of the actor weighs less in the balance as his moral guilt increases
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ciple dictates that the family members who entrusted their decedents to
the care of the mortuary and crematory defendants should have standing
to sue for intentional tort.
A mortuary or crematory that mishandles the remains of a decedent
is especially morally culpable because a relationship of trust is created
when it enters into a funeral contract. While California courts do not
recognize a property right in a decedent's remains, 2 4 they have long rec-
ognized that a person entrusted with the care of a dead body holds it as a
sacred trust for the benefit of all-including family and friends-who
may have an interest in it.25 5 The existence of this sacred trust makes
outrageous conduct by a mortuary or crematorium more morally culpa-
ble than the same conduct by one who has not entered into a funeral
contract. 6 Application of this principle yields the conclusion that the
court should broaden, rather than limit, the class of plaintiffs who may
sue for intentional mishandling of remains.
V. RECOMMENDATION
The California Supreme Court should overrule the portion of the
Christensen opinion that limits the class of plaintiffs who may sue for
intentional mishandling of remains to only those individuals who wit-
nessed the mishandling. The court failed to recognize that the very na-
ture of funeral services dictates that no plaintiffs will witness misconduct
by a mortuary or crematorium. 257 Because of the private nature of the
and the social utility of his conduct diminishes." 59 Cal. 2d at 315, 379 P.2d at 525, 29 Cal.
Rptr. at 45.
254. See supra part II.A.
255. See Huntly v. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co., 100 Cal. App. 201, 207-08, 280
P. 163, 166 (1929). The court, in Quesada v. Oak Hill Improvement Co., stated: "As a society
we want those who are entrusted with the bodies of our dead to exercise the greatest of
care.... [I]t is beyond a simple business relationship-they have assumed a position of special
trust toward the family." 213 Cal. App. 3d 596, 610, 261 Cal. Rptr. 769, 778 (1989) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
256. Professor Leavitt illustrates this argument by pointing out that an undertaker who
offers a photograph of a widow's decedent for newspaper publication will incur liability, while
the same conduct done by a newspaper reporter is not actionable if newsworthy. Leavitt,
supra note 30, at 480-82.
257. However, the court did recognize this in its negligence analysis. The court stated:
[T]he relationship between the family of a decedent and a provider of funeral-related
services exists in major part for the purpose of relieving the bereaved relatives of the
obligation to personally prepare the remains for burial or cremation. The responsi-
bility is delegated to others because family members do not want to undertake or
witness those preparations. Therefore, it would be the exceptional case in which any
family member would observe misconduct of the type alleged in the complaint.
Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 886-87, 820 P.2d at 190, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 88 (emphasis added).
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misconduct, the requirement that plaintiffs be percipient witnesses is
inappropriate.
The Christensen court created an immunity for intentional miscon-
duct, while it simultaneously broadened the class of plaintiffs who could
sue for the same conduct done negligently.2"8 Mortuary and crematory
defendants should not escape liability simply because their conduct oc-
curs behind closed doors. The court should recognize the moral culpa-
bility associated with mistreating human remains,259 apply the doctrine
of transferred intent,2" and allow those same close family members who
can state a cause of action for negligence to sue for intentional mishan-
dling of remains.
Further, the court should restate its holding on the burden of proof
issue to coincide with the position articulated by Justice Kennard.261 A
plaintiff stating a cause of action for negligent mishandling of a dece-
dent's remains should only have to prove his or her decedent was en-
trusted to the mortuary or crematory defendant at a time when the
defendant frequently mishandled remains.262 The burden should then
shift to the defendant to prove that the remains of the plaintiff's decedent
were not mishandled.2 6 3 This is the better approach because it does not
deny recovery to plaintiffs who are otherwise eligible, simply because the
covert nature of the defendants' conduct makes proof by a well-founded
substantial certainty impossible.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Christensen v. Superior Court,2' the California Supreme Court
correctly determined that mortuaries and crematoria owe a duty of care
to close family members of decedents who are entrusted to their care.
However, the court erred when it established a burden of proof that lim-
its recovery for negligent mishandling of remains to only those who can
show by a well-founded substantial certainty that their decedent's re-
mains were mishandled. This heightened burden will preclude recovery
for plaintiffs who should otherwise qualify.
258. Id. at 907, 820 P.2d at 204, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102 (Mosk, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
259. See supra part IV.B.4.
260. See supra part IV.B.3.
261. See Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 919-20, 820 P.2d at 213, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at Ill (Ken-
nard, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
262. Id. at 920, 820 P.2d at 213, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111 (Kennard, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
263. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
264. 54 Cal. 3d 868, 820 P.2d 181, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79 (1991).
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The better approach is to shift the burden to the defendants to prove
there was no mishandling once the plaintiffs prove knowledge that their
decedents were entrusted during a time when those defendants frequently
mishandled remains. This approach is preferable because it takes into
consideration the concealed nature of the mortuary and crematory de-
fendants' conduct.
The Christensen court also incorrectly decided the issue of who may
sue for intentional mishandling of remains. While the court broadened
the class of plaintiffs who may sue for negligent conduct, the court se-
verely limited the class of plaintiffs who can sue for the same mishandling
of corpses done intentionally, simply because the plaintiffs did not wit-
ness the mishandling of their decedents' remains.
This is incorrect because the defendants' conduct-done behind
closed doors-was such that the plaintiffs could not have observed it.
Yet the relatives of the decedents who learned of the mishandling suf-
fered emotional distress, just as if they had witnessed it. The court
should overrule its decision in Christensen to allow the same family
members to sue for intentional tort as may currently sue for negligence.
Alex William Craigie*
* This Note is dedicated to my mother, Mary Craigie, and to Trish. I wish also to thank
Professors David Leonard and John Calmore for their helpful comments.
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